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THERE OUGHTA BE A LAW: WHAT
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

CAN TEACH US ABOUT CONSUMER
CONTRACT FORMATION
Colin P. Marks*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Long before the ALI decided to tackle the issue of contracts
in a consumer context, there existed heated academic debate over
how consumers enter into and are bound to contracts with standard terms. Judge Easterbrook's opinion in the famous, or infamous
depending on your viewpoint, case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg' became a lightning rod for criticism and critique, though issues of
consumer assent pre-date the opinion. In that opinion, in the name
of economic efficiency, Judge Easterbrook adopted an approach to
contract formation which has since been labelled the "rolling contract" approach.2 Under this approach, consumers who make purchases in-store or over the phone have not yet consummated the
contract despite having tendered payment. Instead, when a form
comes later with the terms and conditions, this later form is viewed
*Ernest W. Clemens Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. I
would like to thank and acknowledge the hard work and contributions of my
research assistants Emma Blackwood, Dominic Castillo, Caitlin Edwards,
Lance Kimbro, Emily Reed, Maggi Robert and Stephanie Swanson in researching and writing this Article. I would also like to thank my wife Jill, daughter
Savannah, and son George for their love and support.
1 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (hereinafter ProCDI1), 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996).
2 John E. Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation Theory, 50 DuQ. L. REV. 35, 35 (2012). See also Nika Aldrich, Unplugged: The Music Industry's Approach to Rolling Contracts on Music Cds,
6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 280, 281 (2007) ("Contracts such as these, that
allow acceptance of the terms after the money changes hands, are often called

'rolling contracts."').
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as the offer which is accepted by consumers when they fail to return the product within a stated time period.3 At its heart, ProCD
requires only adequate notice of the terms and a reasonable opportunity to review and reject them.
The opinion has received an avalanche of criticism, and yet
the concept has found traction in the common law.4 Other courts,
many times with little explanation or analysis, began to adopt the
rolling contract approach.' As commerce pivoted into the digital
age, online vendors found it was no longer necessary to send terms
later, as they could simply use the adequate notice concept to make
terms available on their website, either through a link or through
some more active step, such as clicking on an "I agree" button.
Thus, ProCDhelped set the stage for a jump from actual assent to
terms to simply notice of terms to make them binding. Today
online vendors of goods and services pack their websites full of
terms mostly favorable to them, knowing that so long as a court
finds that there was notice of the terms, they will likely be upheld,
assuming it ever even gets to that point, as the mere presence of the
terms may dissuade a customer from even bringing suit.
It is against this backdrop that the Restatement of Consumer Contracts has promulgated Section 2 which explicitly
adopts ProCD'srolling contract approach as well as the concept of
adequate notice for online terms.6 This understandably has made
a number of consumer advocates concerned, as this approach appears to give more power to the powerful businesses who drafted
the terms at the expense of the consumers. Consumer advocates
claim that the adoption of Section 2 in its current form is not justified either as a matter of contract law, or as a restatement of a majority of courts. Many point to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 211(3) which grants courts the ability to evaluate the
3 ProCDII,86 F.3d at 1450-53.
4 SeeHoward v. Ferrellgas Partners, L.P., 748 F.3d 975, 983 (10th Cir. 2014)
(discussing Washington courts' approval of rolling contracts); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The conventional chronology of
contract-making has become unsettled over recent years by courts' increased
acceptance of this so-called 'terms-later' contracting.").
' See, e.g., Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2012)
(accepting the validity of a rolling contract); James v. McDonald's Corp.,
417 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568, 578-79 (2000) (same).

6 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS

INST., Tentative Draft, (April 18, 2019).
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reasonable expectations of the parties when enforcing standard
terms,' and fear that adoption of Section 2 in its current form
would indicate to judges that they no longer have such discretion.
Defenders of Section 2 state that the reporters have correctly
adopted a rule in line with the traditional approach of Restatement
projects, i.e. to discern a majority rule. At its heart, however, this
debate is about whether we should continue to allow judges more
freedom to enforce or not enforce standard terms in contracts, or
whether the law has now moved to the adoption of a law and economics approach to standard terms. The rolling contract approach
is undoubtedly a product of law and economic thinking, and under
this approach, enforcement of standard terms is needed for efficiency in the market place. If a business abuses the forms, the market will react and businesses will have to adjust their forms to remain competitive. Rather than take a side in this debate, in this
article I advocate the subject matter of Section 2, i.e. contract formation with consumers involving standard terms, is a subject best
left to a legislative solution.
Using the literature on Corporate Social Responsibility, I
draw particularly on the business management literature to show
that businesses have three primary responsibilities: to make
money, to follow the law, and to act ethically. When acting ethically is at odds with making more money, even businesses that
wish to act ethically will feel pressure to act unethically. In such a
situation, regulation is necessary to place all competitors on an
equal playing field so that the ethical companies will feel free to act
as they wish without fear of losing a competitive advantage. I posit
that the choice on how to present terms is just such a situation.
Attempting to insert multiple pages of terms favorable to the business in a way the business knows is unlikely to grab the attention
of the consumer is unethical, particularly when the same business
is only presenting it in such a way as to avoid losing a sale. In other
words, if given the choice between making a sale but not including
all of these terms, and presenting pages of terms that need to be
individually initialed and likely losing the sale, most companies
would probably choose the former. It is only through a rolling contract that they get to have it both ways. Thus, a legislative response, akin to the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act,' would be the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

211(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2012).

Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, PUB. L. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
500
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best response, as it would add clarity to the rules of contract formation, but also could provide for punitive measures to discourage
violations.

II.

THE RESTATEMENT'S CONTROVERSIAL

SECTION TWO
The Restatement of Consumer Contracts has been a controversial project since its inception. Some have argued that the
project is unnecessary as there is no separate law of consumer contracts. Others have argued that the project is more appropriate for
a Principles of Law project than for a Restatement. Substantively,
the project has also drawn criticism from both consumer and business advocates. Consumer advocates have argued that some of the
sections, in particular section 2 which addresses standard terms,
favor businesses and subject consumers to terms and conditions
that they never truly assented to.9 Business advocates have argued,
among other things, that the draft Restatement favors consumers
once litigation commences by strengthening claims of unconscionability and permitting the introduction of normally inadmissible

parol evidence.

As Professor Adam Levitin nicely summed up:

But the real issue is that for consumer advocates, the Restatement is a bad project because it would bind all consumers to contractual terms that they do not agree with
or even know about. In contrast, the concern for business
groups is that the Restatement gives that small subset of
consumers who litigate somewhat stronger tools. These
tools aren't strong enough to change the balance of
9 See, e.g., Ian MacDougall, Soon You May Not Even Have to Click on a
Website Contract to Be Bound by Its Terms, PROPUBLICA (May 20, 2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/website-contract-bound-by-its-terms-maynot-even-have-to-click ("At the heart of consumer advocates' objections to the
Restatement is a section that substantially weakens in the consumer context a
core concept of contract law - that a contract requires a "meeting of the minds,"
with each party assenting to its terms. Instead, the Restatement requires businesses only to give customers notice of the contract terms and an opportunity to
review them.").
10 Fred H. Miller, Expert Analysis:A CritiqueofALIs Consumer Contracts
Restatement, 22 CONSUMER FIN. SERV. L. REP. 18 (2019), available at
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor. com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2 019/05/FMiller-Article-in-2 2 CFSLR18.pdf.
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power, but they are enough to be a pain for businesses,
specifically a jettisoning of the parol evidence rule (i.e., it
doesn't matter what the written contract says, the salesman's representations are admissible evidence) and a
contract defense of deception that will apply to some contracts where [statutes addressing unfair or deceptive acts
or practices] would not (again, you've gotta worry about
the sales rep's communications)."
Basically, the Restatement of Consumer Contracts has something
for everyone to hate and has presented a rare instance where consumer and business advocates are in agreement over their objection to the project (though for different reasons).
Rather than assail the entire project, this article focuses primarily on Section Two of the draft Restatement and its treatment
of standard terms. This is not to say that other sections are unobjectionable, but the purpose this article is to demonstrate that certain corporate behaviors are better addressed through legislation
than left to the markets. Section Two represents an adoption of a
law and economics approach that would largely let the market correct abuses of how terms are presented. Though other sections may
also be relevant, Section Two represents a very direct example of
the sort of corporate behaviors that legislation is suited to address.
A. Section Two's Adoption of Standard Terms
Standard terms and conditions are so ubiquitous that many
consumers have become anesthetized to their presence, assuming
they notice them at all. Common provisions in such terms and conditions include limitations on liability, waivers of express and im-

plied warranties, class action waivers, forum selections clauses,
choice of law provisions, and arbitration provisions. 2 Though

" Adam Levitin, Podcast on ALI Consumer ContractsRestatement, Credit
Slips: A Discussion on Credit, Finance, and Bankruptcy (May 16, 2019),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2
019/05/podcast-on-ali-consumer-contracts-restatement.html.
12 See Colin Marks, Online and "As Is", 45 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 25 (2018) (discussing the various damage limitation and warranty disclaimer clauses that impact consumer rights); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts:The Rise
of the Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIz. L.
REV. 637, 644-45 (2007) (discussing the various terms that come after the purchase and the different judicial approach to enforcement of these terms); Jean
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businesses want their terms and conditions to apply to the contracts they enter into with consumers, they know that it is not practical to read out loud these provisions to consumers prior to the
transaction, or to include all of them on the outside on the product.
For in-store purchases, the solution has been to include standard
terms and conditions in the box or package, which can be read by
the consumer at home. For online transactions, the solution is even
easier - simply put the terms on the website and inform the consumer that they are agreeing to these terms and conditions either
by using the website or by purchasing a product. Both of these
forms of assent have faced challenges by consumers with varying
degrees of success. Section Two accepts both of these forms of assent, though the comments make clear there are caveats.
Section Two states:

§ 2. Adoption of Standard Contract Terms
(a) A standard contract term is adopted as part of a consumer contract if, after receiving reasonable notice of the
standard contract term and a reasonable opportunity to
review it, the consumer signifies assent to the transaction.
(b) When a standard contract term is available for review
only after the consumer signifies assent to the transaction, the standard contract term is adopted as part of the
consumer contract if
(1) the consumer receives reasonable notice regarding the existence of the standard contract term before signifying assent to the transaction, and
(2) the consumer has a reasonable opportunity to terminate the transaction after the standard contract
term is made available for review, and does not exercise that power.
(c) If the consumer signifies assent to the transaction, a
contract exists even if some of the standard contract
Braucher Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case
Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for Software,
2004 WIs. L. REV. 753, 758 ("Terms for digital products-hardware, software, or
content-may pop up during installation, and the customer may have to click "I
agree" to get access to a product already paid for and received.").

503
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terms are not adopted. In such case, the terms of the contract are those adopted under subsection (a) or (b), along
with any terms supplied by law.

Subsection (a) addresses assent after notice of terms and so
covers most website agreements. Subsection (b) addresses "cash
now, terms later" contracts, such as when a consumer buys a product in-store, and returns home to find additional terms and conditions, such as a limitation on damages, on a form in the box. I will
address these in reverse order below.
1. The Rolling Contract Approach to Standard Terms
Subsection (b) essentially adopts the "rolling contract" theory of contract formation made famous by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook in ProCD v. Zeidenberg.3 In that case Matthew Zeidenberg
bought ProCD's product, "Select Phone" which was a CD-ROM
disk containing over 95,000,000 telephone listings compiled by

ProCD at a local store. 4 The package included a "Single User License Agreement" prohibiting the purchaser from copying the software other than for personal use which would also appear on most
screens before the listings could be accessed. 5 The license further
noted that if Zeidenberg did not agree to the terms of the license,
he should "promptly return all copies of the software . . . to the
place where [he] obtained it." 6 Zeidenberg subsequently incorporated under the name Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc. and in
contravention of the license, made his own database using the
ProCD listings available over the internet."

ProCD sued to enjoin Zeidenberg, claiming he was in violation of the license agreement.1 8 The district court found for Zeidenberg, concluding that the contract for the software was formed
in the store, and that the additional terms of the license agreement
were mere proposals that could be ignored by Zeidenberg either
under section 2-207(2) or as a modification under section 2-209,

ProCDII, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (hereinafter ProCD1), 908 F. Supp. 640, 64445 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
1S Id at 644-45.
16 Id
at 645. The software box itself also made reference to the license on
13
14

the outside in small print but did not give any details. Id.
17 Id at 645-46.
18 Id
at 646, 649-50.
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both of which would require Zeidenberg's express consent.1 9 On
appeal, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, questioned the
district court's conclusion that the contract was accepted in the
store. 20 Instead of analyzing the case under U.C.C. section 2-207,

as the district court had, the Seventh Circuit relied on U.C.C. section 2-204 as the guiding principle for an approach in which the

terms which came later were the actual offer. 2 Under this section,
the appellate court found that the vendor or seller is the master of
its offer and can choose to invite acceptance by conduct, such as
by using the product.2 2 Judge Easterbrook noted the many advantages of permitting standard term agreements to be enforceable, such as the saved time and expense of trying to describe all of
the terms on the outside of a box,2 3 and held that so long as the
buyer is given an opportunity to review and reject the offer, such
contracts are enforceable.2 4 Zeidenberg had been given notice of
the license agreement, continued to use the software, and so the
court found he was bound by the license agreement's terms. 25
In ProCDthere had at least been notice prior to the purchase that additional terms would apply, 26 but just over seven
months after ProCDwas decided, the Seventh Circuit, in another
opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook, made clear that prior notice was not required. In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,2 7 Rich and

Enza Hill purchased a Gateway computer over the phone. 2 The
Hills were never alerted to any additional terms that were coming
with the computer, 29 but once it arrived, inside the box were a list

19
20

Id

at 654-55.

ProCDII,86 F.3d at 1452.

21

Id

26

ProCDII, 86 F.3d at 1449-50.
Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).

Easterbrook summarily dismisses its application stating, "Our case
has only one form; UCC section 2-207 is irrelevant." Id Of course, section 2-207
applies to confirmations as well, so the implication that the lack of multiple battling forms would somehow preclude application of 2-207 is in error.
22 Id at 1452-53.
23 Id at 1451.
24 Id at 1453.
25 Id at 1452-53. The court of appeals went on to address the district
court's alternative finding that the contract was preempted by federal law and
found that the copyright did not preempt ProCD's contract claim. Id at 1454-

55.
27

28 Id at 1148.
29

Id
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of additional terms, including an arbitration clause, which purportedly governed the parties' agreement unless the Hills returned
the product within 30 days, which the Hills did not do. 30 The Hills
eventually sued Gateway for civil RICO violations and Gateway
invoked the arbitration clause. 3' The district court refused to uphold the clause finding that the Hills were not given adequate prior
notice of the terms.3 2
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, citing to the ProCD decision, vacated and remanded, finding that the terms of the contract
that came in the box were fully enforceable.3 3 Judge Easterbrook
rejected the notion that ProCD should be limited to software
sales,3 4 or that ProCD required notice of the coming terms on the
outside of the box, though he found the Hills were made aware of
the terms through advertising. 35 Easterbrook held that the central
question was one of contract formation:
The question in ProCD was not whether terms were
added to a contract after its formation, but how and
when the contract was formed-in particular, whether a
vendor may propose that a contract of sale be formed, not
in the store (or over the phone) with the payment of
money or a general "send me the product," but after the
customer has had a chance to inspect both the item and
the terms. ProCDanswers "yes," for merchants and consumers alike. 36
Thus, under ProCD a vendor is the "master of the offer" and can
transform in-store consumer transactions from the point of contract formation into some sort of preliminary step that eventually
leads to the real offer - the standard terms that come later.3 7
This rolling contract approach represented a departure
from the traditional approach to in-store and over-the-phone

31

Id
Id

32

Id

30

3 Id at 1150-51.
3 Id at 1149.
3 Id
at 1150. Easterbrook also dismissed the notion that the ProCD decision turned upon UCC section 2-207, erroneously dismissing the provision as
irrelevant because there was only one form involved.
36 Id
at 1150.
3 Id at 1149.
506

2020]

There Oughta Be a Law

purchases. 38 Normally one would treat the product on the shelf as
a mere solicitation of an offer. 39 The customer would then make
the "offer" to purchase the product at the advertised price, and the
vendor would accept, typically by processing payment.4 0 With the
See Stephen E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2006) (discussing a brief history of rolling contracts, with terms being
presented by the seller over time); Jean Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the
Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case Against EnforcingDelayedMass-Market Terms, Especiallyfor Software, 2004 WiS. L. REV. 753, 757 (2004) (referring
to rolling contracts as "steamrolling" terms onto the consumer); Robert Hillman,
Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 (2002) ("In a rolling contract,
a consumer orders and pays for goods before seeing most of the terms, which are
contained on or in the packaging of the goods. Upon receipt, the buyer enjoys
the right to return the goods for a limited period of time.").
38

39 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

26 (AM. LAW INST. 2012)

("A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making
it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent."). See also Craft v. Elder & Johnston Co., 38 N.E.2d 416 (Ohio
App. 1941) ("Thus, if goods are advertised for sale at a certain price, it is not an
offer and no contract is formed by the statement of an intending purchaser that
he will take a specified quantity of the goods at that price. The construction is
rather favored that such an advertisement is a mere invitation to enter into a
bargain rather than an offer. So a published price list is not an offer to sell the
goods listed at the published price.") (quoting Williston on Contracts, Vol. 1, par.
27, page 54); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Russell, 519 N.W.2d 460, at 463 (Minn.
App. 1994) (holding that the general rule is an advertisement of goods is not an
offer, but merely an invitation to bargain even if the good is offered for a certain
price).
40 See Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 371 N.E.2d. 634, 639 (Ill. 1977)
("Although in some cases the advertisement itself may be an offer (seeLefkowitz
v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 251 Minn. 188,86 N.W.2d 689 (1957)),
usually it constitutes only an invitation to deal on the advertised terms. Only
when the merchant takes the money is there an acceptance of the offer to purchase."); Crocker v. New London W. & P. R. Co., 24 Conn. 249, 262 (1855) (holding a discounted purchase price of a train ticket was a mere proposal that did
not create a binding contract because there had not been an actual acceptance
by the ticket office); O'Keefe v. Lee Calan Imports, Inc., 262 N.E.2d 758, 759
(Ill. App. 1970) ("It is quite possible to make a definite and operative offer to buy
or to sell goods by advertisement, in a newspaper, by a handbill, or on a placard
in a store window. It is not customary to do this, however; and the presumption
is the other way. Neither the advertiser nor the reader of his notice understands
that the latter is empowered to close the deal without further expression by the
former. Such advertisements are understood to be mere requests to consider and
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contract fully formed, U.C.C. section 2-207 would label any later
terms a "confirmation" of the contract with additional terms that,
as between a merchant and a consumer, would be a mere proposal
for addition to the contract.4 1 As such, a consumer would need to
expressly assent to the additional terms to be bound.4 2 A similar
result would apply at common law.43 So if the product being purchased was, for instance, a concert ticket, the contract would be

examine and negotiate; and no one can reasonably regard them otherwise unless
the circumstances are exceptional and the words used are very plain and clear.")
(quoting Corbin on Contracts § 25 (1963)).
41 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012) ("The
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.");
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp.2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding under Kansas law that if at least one party is not a merchant additional terms are
mere proposals and require express assent in order to bind the buyer, even if he
keeps the product longer than 5 days). But see Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that later received terms were assented to
by the buyer through conduct of keeping the product for over 30 days).
42 See Quality Wood Designs, Inc. v. Ex-Factory, Inc., 40 F.Supp.3d
1137,
1145 (D.S.D. 2014) (stating that in transactions involving a non-merchant, the
non-merchant must assent to any terms offered after the initial purchase);
McCaulley v. Nebraska Furniture Mart, Inc., 838 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Neb. App. Ct.
2013) (finding a non-merchant had to manifest assent to additional terms because "[t]he plain language of the [Nebraska] Legislature in § 2-207(2) makes a
distinction between contracts entered into between two merchants and contracts
entered into where at least one of the parties is a nonmerchant."); Klocek v.
Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp.2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (rejecting the "vendor
is the master of the offer" analysis in ProCDand holding under the statutory
interpretation where one party is not a merchant, an express manifestation of
assent is required to make the terms binding).
43 Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643, 646 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussing Mississippi's version of UCC § 2-207's rejection of the common law mirror image rule that changes additional terms of a proposed agreement into a
counteroffer requiring assent by the opposing party); Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
569 P.2d 751, 760 (Cal. 1977) (discussing "the traditional rule that, in order to
create an enforceable contract, the parties must mutually assent to all essential
terms of the supposed agreement."); Colin P. Marks, Not What, But When is an
Offer: Rehabilitatingthe Rolling Contract, 46 CONN. L. REv. 73, 89 (2013) (stating that "the common law would not vary greatly from . . .. [U.C.C. § 207(2)] in
situations involving non-merchants . . . . [T]he modification could not be unilaterally imposed upon the other party once a contract was formed and would
additionally need to have consideration to support it (which is not required un-

der the U.C.C.)").
508
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formed on the spot, and any later arriving terms would be proposed amendments.4 4
The rolling contract approach rejects this construct, and instead favors the efficiency of allowing vendors to impose their
terms after the initial assent to the transaction. 45 This approach has
been widely cited and adopted by a number commentators 46 and
courts. 47 Unfortunately, many courts adopting this approach
44 Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, L.P., 748 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 2014)
(holding that adding a later arbitration clause to a preexisting oral agreement
required express consent by the opposing party in order to be a part of the original agreement); Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d
91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the UCC rejected the last shot rule and requires either an express assent to the additional terms or an analysis determining
if the terms were assented to under 2-207); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that terms received after the purchase of
goods require a manifestation of assent by the buyer and mere retention of the
good beyond a specified number of days did not equate to assent by failure to
object).
45 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing
the efficacy and practical considerations of not requiring a vendor to provide
terms up front or to be read at cash register and actually make customers better
off); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir.1996) ("A vendor,
as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept
by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance."); Defontes
v. Dell, Inc. 984 A.2d 1061, 1071 (R.I. 2009) ("It is simply unreasonable to expect
a seller to apprise a consumer of every term and condition at the moment he or
she makes a purchase. A modern consumer neither expects nor desires to wade
through such minutia, particularly when making a purchase over the phone,
where full disclosure of the terms would border on the sadistic.").
46 Richard A. Epstein, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Do Doctrine and Function
Mix?, in CONTRACTS STORIES 122 (Douglas G. Baird ed., Foundation Press,
2007) (defending Easterbrook's approach on intellectual grounds); Hillman
[Rolling Contracts], supranote 38, at 744-45 (arguing that, because consumers
don't read the terms regardless of when it was formed, the formation issue
should not be a bar to rolling contracts and such contracts should instead simply
be viewed for their conscionability). See also Andrew Vogeler, Rolling Contract
Formation and the U.C.C. 's Approach to Emerging Commercial Practices,
30 J.L. & COM. 243, 243-44 (2012) (suggesting that the rolling contract theory is
consistent with the policies underlying the U.C.C.); UNIFORM COMPUTER

INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT,

§

202 (2002).

4 See, e.g., Meridian Project Systems, Inc. v. Hardin Const. Co., LLC,
426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (finding the rationale in ProCD"compelling" and
recognizing that where a consumer had notice of an end user license agreement
509
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and an opportunity to return the software if it did not agree to the terms, "[t]he
EULA is not rendered invalid merely because [the consumer] purchased the
Prolog software and then received the EULA after opening the package"); Sherr
v. Dell, Inc., No. 05 CV 10097(GBD), 2006 WL 2109436, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(recognizing that "[a]pprove-or-return contracts have been found to be enforceable in consumer transactions,"); Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704 (S.D. Ill. 2005) ("By using her phone rather than canceling immediately, or no later than thirty days after her activation date, Chandler accepted the offered services and the terms and conditions under which they
were offered. She had a clear mechanism and reasonable opportunity to reject
them."); Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d
1164, 1178 (E.D. Mo. 2004) ("[T]he defendants had sufficient notice of the EULAs and TOU. It is true that the terms of the EULAs and TOU were not on the
box, but the terms were disclosed before installation of the games and access to
Battle.net was granted. The defendants also expressly consented to the terms of
the EULA and TOU by clicking 'I Agree' and 'Agree.' .... Accordingly, the
Court finds that the EULA and TOU are enforceable contracts under both Missouri or California law."); O'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 51516 (M.D. La. 2003) (approving of the approach taken in Hill and ProCD); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105-06 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding
Hill to be instructive); I.Lan Sys., Inc., v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (agreeing "with those cases embracing the
theory of ProCD," holding that that "clickwrap license agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts," and determining that "'[m]oney now, terms
later' is a practical way to form contracts, especially with purchasers of software."); Mudd-Lyman Sales and Serv. Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 236 F.
Supp. 2d 907, 911-12 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("The Court finds that Mudd-Lyman accepted the terms of UPS's limitation of liability through the breaking of the
shrinkwrap seal and by its on-screen acceptance of the terms of the software
license agreement. Mudd-Lyman was thereby provided with reasonable notice
of UPS's limited liability and was given a fair opportunity to purchase higher
liability."); Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014,
at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) ("Analogous support for this Court's conclusion that the physical location of the disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability inside the Zip drive packaging does not make the disclaimer inconspicuous can be found in some cases from other jurisdictions."); Westendorf v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *3 (Del. Ch. March 16,
2000) ("The 7th Circuit rejected that argument, however, and found the agreement enforceable as written. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the unanimous
panel, noted '[b]y keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the [buyers] accepted
Gateway's offer, including the arbitration clause.' Undeniably, plaintiff in the
present case retained the computer and accessories for more than thirty days.
The same rationale, therefore, applies to this plaintiff as in the case before the
7th Circuit.") (internal citations omitted); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 140
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simply cite to ProCD with little explanation as to why the approach is appropriate.48

2. Assent to Standard Terms via Website
Subsection (a), on its face, appears very unoffensive. Essentially it affirms the very basic concept that, so long as a consumer
is fairly presented with the terms, and given an opportunity to re-

view the terms, they are assented to. Where this section becomes
interesting is in the context of online contracts, which is addressed
largely through the comments.
Assent to standard terms in online contracts can be passive
or active, depending on the way they are presented. The most common method of presenting terms and conditions appears to be via
"browsewrap" terms. Browsewrap terms are made available on the
website somewhere and are accessible by a link. The placement of
this link and its conspicuousness frequently become the basis of
attacks on the enforceability of such terms. A typical browsewrap
(Me. 2005) ("By accepting delivery of the computers, and then failing to exercise
their right to return the computers as provided by the agreement, Stenzel and
Gerber expressly manifested their assent to be bound by the agreement, including its arbitration clause."); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246, 250-51
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("While Hill and ProCD,as the IAS Court recognized, are
not controlling (although they are decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit encompassing the forum State designated for arbitration),
we agree with their rationale that, in such transactions, there is no agreement or
contract upon the placement of the order or even upon the receipt of the goods.");
Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1997 WL 823611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 31, 1997)
(holding that 2-207 did not apply as the contract formed once the plaintiff exercised the opportunity to accept the goods and accompanying terms); Defontes v.
Dell, Inc. 984 A.2d 1061, 1071 (R.I. 2009) ("[W]e are satisfied that the ProCDline
of cases is better reasoned and more consistent with contemporary consumer
transactions."); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc., v. Timberline Software Corp.,
998 P.2d 305, 313-14 (Wash. 2000) (holding that shrinkwrap terms were sufficiently presented to the buyer and continued use of the product manifested assent to the terms).
48

See, e.g., M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc., v. Timberline Software Corp.,

998 P.2d 305, 313-14 (Wash. 2000) ("We find the approach of the ProCD, Hill,
and Brower courts persuasive and adopt it... ."); Brower v. Gateway 2000,
246 A.D.2d 246, 250-51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (simply noting that ProCDand
Hillwere applicable). See also Friedman [Improving the Rolling Contract], supra note 38, at 11 (summarizing cases which focus on return policies rather than
notice).
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agreement will "contain a notice that-by merely using the services
of, obtaining information from, or initiating applications within

the website-the user is agreeing to and is bound by the site's terms
of service."" Frequently, browsewrap agreements are nothing
more than inconspicuous links at the bottom of the webpage which
are passive in nature, in that there is no need to click separately to
continue with a purchase."
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.i is an oft-cited
example of a failure to put a reasonable consumer on inquiry notice. 2 In Specht, the plaintiffs downloaded "free" software from
Netscape's website. The catch was that the software transmitted
private information about the plaintiffs to Netscape, 53 and the
plaintiffs sued for violations of federal law. Netscape moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to a provision that was part of the
terms in the license agreement.5 4 These terms appeared on the
webpage from which the plaintiffs downloaded the software, 55 but
it was not located near the "download" button on the visible screen.
56 Instead, it was visible only if the plaintiffs continued scrolling
down the webpage. 57

On appeal, the Second Circuit court affirmed the district
court and refused to enforce the arbitration provision due to the
submerged nature of the terms. 58 The court stated:
We conclude that in circumstances such as these, where
consumers are urged to download free software at the immediate click of a button, a reference to the existence of
license terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to
place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
See Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (delineating the nature of browsewrap by calling it "passive"); see also Ian Ayres
Alan Schwartz, The No-ReadingProblem in Consumer ContractLaw, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 545, 548 (2014) (defining browsewrap as allowing "buyers to purchase
without seeing a prominent hyperlink to the underlying terms").
" Specht v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 306 F.3d
17 (2d Cir. 2002).
49

&

SO

52

Id at 32.

3 Id at 20-21.
54 Id
5 Id at 25.
56

5
58

Id at 23-25.
Id
Id at 40.
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those terms. The SmartDownload webpage screen was
printed in such a manner that it tended to conceal the fact
that it was an express acceptance of Netscape's rules and
regulations. Internet users may have, as defendants put
it, "as much time as they need[ ]" to scroll through multiple screens on a webpage, but there is no reason to assume that viewers will scroll down to subsequent screens
simply because screens are there. When products are
"free" and users are invited to download them in the absence of reasonably conspicuous notice that they are
about to bind themselves to contract terms, the transactional circumstances cannot be fully analogized to those
in the paper world of arm's-length bargaining.5 9

In so holding, the court distinguished other cases in which "there
was much clearer notice .

.

. that a user's act would manifest assent

to contract terms" and were thus enforceable.60
The primary problem with browsewrap agreements is the

passive way in which consumers assent. Even when browsewrap
terms are on the same page as a "checkout" button, they have been
held unenforceable when they were inconspicuous 6 ' or otherwise
failed to put the consumer on notice that the purchase was subject
to the terms and conditions.6 2 Despite deficiencies in browsewrap,
9

Id at 32 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

60 Id at 33-35.

61 Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 396 (calling attention to prominence as a requirement to put consumers on notice of browsewrap terms and conditions and
listing numerous cases on both district and appellate levels holding such terms
are invalid if they are inconspicuous); Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 200 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 117, 126 (Ct. App. 2016) (describing the browsewrap terms at issue in
the case as "simply too inconspicuous to meet [the Specht] standard"). In fact,
the Ninth Circuit has even held that conspicuoushyperlinks may be unenforceable. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2014)
("[W]e therefore hold that where a website makes its terms of use available via
a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no
notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate
assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click
on-without more-is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.").
62 SeeLee v. Intelius Inc., 737 F.3d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding
the trial court's denial of a request to compel arbitration because the defendant
failed to provide adequate notice of the arbitration clause to the consumer);
Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 395 ("For an internet browsewrap contract to be
binding, consumers must have reasonable notice of a company's 'terms of use'
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there is evidence that they are still used by a majority of online
vendors. 63 However, other forms of online agreements have also
emerged that are more conspicuous. Two other forms of agreement
that are less passive are "banner wraps" and "sign-in wrap."
Banner wraps are a newer form of agreement. 64 These appear on a banner when a user first visits a website, sometime at the
top or bottom of the viewable screen, but they can also appear
across the page, obstructing the view of some of the page's content.6 5 These have recently become a popular way to inform users
that the webpage's owner uses cookies or that there is a privacy
agreement, but they can also reference other terms and conditions.66 Banners can be passive, such as when they just appear at
the bottom of the page, or active such as when the user is required
to hit "I agree" to make the banner disappear.6 7
Sign-in wraps are also less passive and appear to be gaining
popularity among online vendors. 68 Sign-in wrap agreements typi-

cally require users to create an account with the online vendor.
When the account is created, the user is notified "of the existence
and applicability of the site's 'terms of use' when proceeding
through the website's sign-in or checkout process." 69 When used in
and exhibit 'unambiguous assent' to those terms.") (citing Specht v. Netscape
Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)).
63 See Colin P. Marks, Online Terms as in Terrorem Devices,
78 MD. L.
REV. 247, 284 (2019) ("So far, it has been established that the vast majority of
the largest online sellers prefer to use browsewrap to make consumers aware of
the terms and conditions that they are trying to impose, despite this being the
least effective "wrap" method available.") (recognizing the common use of
browsewrap despite its known deficiencies).
64 See id at 256 (establishing the relatively recent development of browsewrap).
65 See id. at 256-57 ("[S]ome websites have resorted to a banner flashing
across the screen [known as bannerwrap] which display the terms, presumably
to avoid arguments that the web-site did not clearly present the online terms and
conditions") (citing Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir.
2016).
66 Id

See id at 256 ("These banners appear at the bottom or top of the viewable
page or are on display across the middle of the page, obscuring the content of
the website.").
68 Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-CV-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934, at *4
(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016) ("[M]any internet websites-including Airbnb during the
relevant time period-now use 'sign-in-wraps.'").
69 Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 397.
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this way, sign-in wraps are more active than pure browsewrap

agreements in that there is an initial notification, but thereafter,
checkouts do not require the user to assent each time to the vendor's terms and conditions." This type of sign-in wrap is used by
Amazon.com, but other online vendors use it as well." Another
form of sign-in wrap is to simply have a notification next to the

"check-out" button informing the user that by proceeding, user is
binding themselves to the retailer's terms and conditions."2
Browsewrap, banner wrap and sign-in wrap are all varying

forms of passive assent in that they don't necessarily require the
user to explicitly assent to the terms and conditions. Two other
forms of online assent that do require active assent are clickwrap
and scrollwrap. Clickwrap agreements require a user to actually
agree to the site's terms and conditions before proceeding.7 3 A typical clickwrap agreement would present in the form of a box that
must be checked by the user before proceeding, " and which informs the user that by checking the box, they are agreeing to the
terms and conditions (whether they read them or not)." Thus the

70 Resorb Networks, Inc. v. YouNow.com, 30 N.Y.S. 3d 506, 512 (Sup. Ct.
2016) ("YouNow states that the website is designed so that a user is notified of
the existence and applicability of the site's 'terms of use' when proceeding
through the website's sign-in or login process. That could be characterized as a
sign-in-wrap.") (internal citation omitted).
" See Marks, supra note 12, at 13 ("One form, [known as sign-in wrap]
which Amazon.com requires, forces users to create an account and sign in before
shopping.").
72 Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 401 (describing typical qualities of an enforceable sign-in wrap agreement).
3 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("Clickwrap agreements require a user to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging awareness of and agreement to the terms of service before he or
she is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the website."). See also Mark
A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (highlighting the
activity requirement (i.e. clicking a box) of the "clickwrap" designation and contending that "every court to consider the issue has held clickwrap licenses enforceable").
4 See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(clearly defining clickwrap as requiring the consumer to utilize a checkbox indicating assent).
" See Id (clarifying that clickwrap "require[es] that the user manifest his or
her assent to the terms").
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user is in effect put on inquiry notice of the terms assented to. 76
Scrollwraps take the concept one step further by forcing the user
to view the terms and conditions as part of the website's construction and design.77 Instead of simply being presented with a box to
check, the user would be presented with a pop-up box containing
the terms and conditions, and a requirement that the user agree to
these terms and conditions.7 ' Due to the requirement of active assent, case law seems to suggest that clickwrap and scrollwrap
agreements are generally enforceable.79
Despite the varying degrees of enforceability, the Restatement of Consumer Contracts blesses all manner of wrap agreements. Comment 4. to Section 2 provides:
When the consumer manifests assent to the transaction,
a consumer contract is formed. The consumer contract
includes the core deal terms (those which, from the perspective of the consumer, characterize the bargain), as
well as other standard and nonstandard contract terms
reasonably available for review prior to manifesting assent. Some of these standard contract terms may be explicitly acknowledged by the consumer in the course of
76 Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 397. See Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft
Sales, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 675, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("Inquiry notice exists where a
person has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent person
using ordinary care to make further inquiries. Where the person does not take
those added steps, he or she is chargeable with knowledge that would have been
acquired through diligent inquiry."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
§ 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (focusing on the "intent" and "conduct" requirements
of contractual assent).
" Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 398.
78

See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contractingin the Age of the Internet of Things:

Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 873 n.200 (2016)
("Clickwrap agreements are also referred to as click-through agreements. Scrollwrap agreements are another type of clickwrap agreement.") (citations omitted).
See also Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002)
("The contract is entered into by the subscriber clicking an 'Accept' button below the scroll box . . . . Neither is the use of a 'scroll box' in the electronic version that displays only part of the Agreement at any one time inimical to the

provision of adequate notice.").
79 Cheryl B. Preston, "Please Note: You Have Waived Everything"- Can
Notice Redeem Online Contracts?, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 544 (2015) ("Clickwrap agreements are generally enforceable, standard form contracts that Internet users assent to merely by clicking an 'I agree' option.").
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manifesting assent to the transaction (see Illustrations 24). Other standard contract terms may not be explicitly
acknowledged, but as long as the consumer receives reasonable notice of them, including reasonable notice that
they are intended to be part of the transaction and that
manifesting assent would constitute a legally binding
adoption of those terms, and has a reasonable opportunity to review them, they are adopted when the consumer manifests assent to the transaction (see Illustrations 5-6).80

Illustrations 2-5 then give examples of scrollwrap, 8 1 clickwrap, 2
sign-in wrap,83 and broweswrap8 4 as all being enforceable against
a consumer. This is despite there being case law to the contrary on
various types of wrap agreements, particularly browsewrap. This
has caused some consternation amongst many consumer advocates.
B. Criticismsof Section Two

Long before the Restatement of Consumer Contracts was
drafted, significant controversy surrounded the rolling contract
approach85 as well as the use and abuse of online forms of assent
that really amounted to nothing more than notice. 86 Rolling

80

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 2, illus. 4 (AM.

LAW INST., Tentative Draft, (April 18, 2019).
81

Id

at illus. 2.

82

Id

at illus. 3.

83

Id

at illus. 4.

84
85

Id at illus. 5.
See, e.g., Roger C. Bern, "TermsLater" Contracting:Bad Economics, Bad

Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge EasterbrookNotwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 641, 642 (2004) ("[ProCD]and its initial progeny, Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., however, have been deservedly and widely criticized, variously described as a 'swashbuckling tour de force that dangerously misinterprets legislation and precedent,' a 'real howler' that is 'dead wrong' on its interpretation of section 2-207 of the U.C.C., a decision that 'flies in the face of
U.C.C. policy and precedent,' a 'detour from traditional U.C.C. analysis' 'contrary to public policy,' with analysis that 'gets an "F" as a law exam."').
86 Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to
the Law of the Horse, 26 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 1, 18 (2012) ("The idea is that by
'browsing' the site, the user enters a contract, but this legal consequence need
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contract theory has been attacked by numerous commentators on
various grounds such as the analysis under the U.C.C., 87 the economic assumptions the approach makes, 88 moral grounds8 9 and
fairness grounds. 90 Professor Roger Bern has written a sweeping
criticism of the approach, arguing, among other things, that it "fails
to protect the reasonable expectations of buyers while at the same
time protecting the unreasonable expectations of vendors, thus
abandoning the only moral justification for courts to enforce promises."9 ' This is particularly troublesome when one considers that
consumers are unlikely to attempt to unwind their deals after the
fact. As one commentator has observed:

not be brought to the user's attention either before or after browsing, and although the courts insist that some 'notice' be given of the existence of the terms
supposedly incorporated into this contractual arrangement, courts may not require the terms to be located anywhere very conspicuous.").
87 See Bern, supra note 85, at 642-43, n.5 (collecting criticisms); John E.
Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation Theory,
50 DUQ. L. REV. 35, 47-48 (2012) ("Either this highly sophisticated court did not
understand the contract formation sections of the U.C.C., or it chose to ignore
them."); Shubha Ghosh, Where's the Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections
on the Visible Hand of Norm Creation, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1125, 1134 (2000)
("Even though Judge Easterbrook concludes that § 2-207 is inapplicable because the provision governs the situation when there are two opposing forms
from the offeror and the offeree, not one as in the Gateway 2000 case, this view
has been expressly rejected.").
88 See Bern, supra note 85, at 716-42 (characterizing Easterbrook's "Terms
Later" approach as ignorant of human nature and economic reality); Ghosh, supra note 87, at 1139 (questioning the efficacy assumptions at the heart of the
rolling contracts approach).
89

See id. at 642-53 (arguing ProCDlacks "moral sanction").

See id. at 643-44 ("[N]otwithstanding Easterbrook's window dressing of
economics, a rule sanctioning 'terms later' contracting increases ... distributional unfairness by systematically redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors."); Jean Braucher, supra note 12, at 757 (asserting rolling contracts should
more accurately be labeled as "steamrolling" as they attempt to pile on undesirable terms).
91 See Bern, supranote 85, at 644. I myself have argued that the rolling contract approach would only be appropriate where the parties anticipated an ongoing relationship with the seller such that additional terms were expected.
Colin P. Marks, Not What, But When is an Offer: Rehabilitatingthe Rolling
Contract, 46 CONN. L. REV. 73, 114-115 ("Transactions that envision ongoing
services may very well be understood to involve more than a simple in-store
payment and thus justify delaying the offer.").
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American customers might shop carefully, but they
rarely retract a deal after the sale has been closed. This
gives the seller an unfair advantage within our cultural
context because the customer doesn't get the bad news
about the license until after comparison shopping is complete and the purchase is made. 92
Apart from these problems, others have noted that the rolling contract approach is actually a departure from traditional contract
doctrine, arguing that ProCD"rushes to cut away the broader historical context and foundational principles" of contact law. 93
It has been argued that this loosening of contract law has
opened the door to the online assent forms that are now so prevalent, and which the Restatement of Consumer Law blesses. 94 Professors Robin Kar and Margaret Radin, in recognizing the move-

ment from a traditional contract in the 1880s to one chock full of
standard term boilerplate today, have argued that the modern
"contract" formed through assent is really a form of "pseudo-contract."95 They argue that courts should engage in a "shared meaning" analysis that is more consistent with traditional contract law. 96
Professors Preston and McCann have similarly complained about
this shift in contract law, observing,

92

Cem Kaner, ProposedArticle 211: Problems from the Customer's View,

UCC BULLETIN (Feb. 1997), at 1, 4; "[I]t is unrealistic to expect customers to
return products under these circumstances, even if the terms are entirely unreasonable." Id at 3. See also Braucher, supra note 12, at 767 ("[I]t is also only
logical to believe that producers fought so hard for the right to make delayed
disclosure because they do not want to compete on terms (or, for monopolists,
lose sales from advance disclosure of unfavorable terms) and therefore hold
them back until customers would find it cognitively challenging, time-consuming, and otherwise costly to reverse transactions.").
93 Preston & McCann, supra note 86 at 8; William H. Lawrence, Rolling
ContractsRolling Over ContractLaw, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1099, 1109 (2004)
("Once it enters into a contract with the buyer, the vendor cannot unilaterally
change the terms of the contract-not even when allowing the alternative of
ending the contract.").
94
95

See Preston & McCann, supra note 86, at 16-19.
Robin B. Kar & Margaret J. Radin, Pseudo-ContractandShared Mean-

ing Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135, 1139-42 (2019) ("[Courts] assume that
pseudo-contractual text should be enforced as 'contract' with minimal requirements of 'assent."').
96 Id at 1166.
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[c]onsumers are entering into contracts on such a regular
basis that it is no longer a significant event to assent to an
agreement, as it may have been before products and services became so available through the Internet. And beyond the sheer number of contracts, the lack of formalities in contract acceptance online further strip the
consumer of awareness she may have had in traditional
paper contracting where the parties might drive to a

meeting-place, thumb through documents, and apply a
physical signature.97
Given the negative reaction online contracting has received, it is
not surprising that critics of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts have complained that Section 2 will further destroy meaningful assent. 98
Consumer advocates in this camp have pointed to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) as providing courts with
the freedom to only enforce standard terms that are within the reasonable expectations of the parties. 99 Indeed an amendment was
proposed at the May 2019 annual meeting aimed at explicitly in-

corporating this standard into Section 2. Though the amendment
failed to garner a majority of support, the debate was vigorous and
the vote was by no means a landside. Without an explicit nod to
97

Preston & McCann, supra note 86, at 27-28.

98 See Ian MacDougall, Soon You May Not Even Have to Click on a Website Contract to Be Bound by Its Terms, PROPUBLICA (May 20, 2019),
https://www.propublica.org/article/website-contract-bound-by-its-terms-maynot-even-have-to-click ("At the heart of consumer advocates' objections to the
Restatement is a section that substantially weakens in the consumer context a
core concept of contract law - that a contract requires a "meeting of the minds,"
with each party assenting to its terms. Instead, the Restatement requires businesses only to give customers notice of the contract terms and an opportunity to
review them.").

99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

211(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2012)

("Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term,
the term is not part of the agreement."); id at cmt. e. ("Apart from government
regulation, courts in construing and applying a standardized contract seek to
effectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who
accepts it."); id at cmt. f ("Although customers typically adhere to standardized
agreements and are bound by them without even appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the
range of reasonable expectation.").
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the reasonable expectations test, consumer advocates fear the Restatement will stifle the development of the law which is still in its
infancy when it comes to online contracting. Professor Nancy Kim
has summarized the evolution of the law and the negative effect
the proposed Section 2 would have as follows:
The beauty of the common law is that it usually self-corrects when it goes too far. Recent cases addressing electronic adhesive contracts have a more sophisticated and
nuanced discussion of what meets the standard of "reasonable notice," reflecting an understanding that the context and format in which a contract is presented matters.
...

Some courts have started to question whether a man-

ifestation of assent is enough to show consent to all the
terms, showing signs of requiring specific assent to important, rights-altering terms like mandatory arbitration
or recurring fee provisions. . . . In other words, recent

cases seem to be swinging the pendulum back toward
reasonable expectations, or at least away from unconsented-to terms.... The [Restatement of Consumer Contracts] would forcibly stunt the development of the law
of consumer contracts at this very dynamic period, and it
would do so by endorsing an approach which runs counter to the common law of contracts. More alarming, it
would extend the application of this errant strand of law,
which was developed for a particular type of consumer
contract in a particular environment and apply it to all
consumer contracts.0 0

Apart from the perceived doctrinal weaknesses in the approaches adopted in the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, critics have also been quite critical of the methodology. 101 Professor
Gregory Klass attempted to recreate the empirical study relied
upon by the Reporters regarding whether courts treat stand-alone

100 Nancy S. Kim, The ProposedRestatement of the Law of Consumer Con-

tracts and the Struggle Over the Soul Of ContractLaw, JURIST - ACADEMIC
https://www.jurist.org/commen(June 2,
2019),
tary/2 019/6/nancy-kim-contracts-restatement.
101 See id. (noting objections to both the methodology used and the Reporters' interpretation of the cases relied upon).
COMMENTARY
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privacy policies as contract terms.1 2 He found fundamental methodological flaws in the study, as well as widespread misreading of
cases, leading him to conclude that of the forty cases relied upon,
only fifteen were relevant to privacy-policy issues." 3 His conclusions drew the suspicion of another group of academics who likewise reexamined the empirical studies underlying the Restatements' proposed approach to contract modifications and
clickwrap assent.10 4 Similar to Klass, this group found that of the
89 modification cases, 63% were inapposite,'0 5 and of the 98 click-

wrap cases, 46% were not relevant. 0 6 These problems led the
group to announce that they lacked "confidence that the draft Restatement correctly and accurately 'restates' the law of consumer
contracts."0 7 Furthermore, it has been noted that even the existing
case law addressing issues of online terms fails to address the myriad issues that can arise in a coherent manner.1 08 In light of all of
these concerns, Professor Budnitz summarizes the Restatement effort as follows:
[T]here is a fundamental problem in trying to draft a re-

statement of the law of consumer contracts that includes
online contracting. There are few cases in few jurisdictions that have dealt with issues of online contract formation; there is little uniformity of analysis and very few

appellate-level cases. It is premature to issue a restatement of the law when there is no consensus among the
courts on what the law is.' 09
The Reporters' and their defenders have primarily defended their approach to the Restatement project as consistent
with the ALI's traditional approach. They claim that the Restatement simply reflects what courts are doing, which is to accept the
102 See Gregory Klass, Empiricism andPrivacyPoliciesin the Restatement
of Consumer ContractLaw, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2019).
103 Id at 73-74.
104 Adam J. Levitin et al., The FaultyFoundationof the DraftRestatement

of Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 455 (2019).
105 Id
at 455-56.
106 Id
at 460-61.
107 Id at 466.
108 Mark E. Budnitz, Touching, Tapping, and Talking:
The Formation of
Contracts in Cyberspace, 43 NOVA L. REV. 235, 265-71 (2019) (summarizing
various issues raised when contracting in an online environment).
109 Id at 476.
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reality that consumers don't read their contracts."0 Practitioner
and ALI member Steven Weise has written a sweeping defense of
the project in the ALI Advisor, claiming,

[T]here has been a convergence of (i) court decisions applying the common law of contracts to the necessary elements for the formation of a contract in the context of an
online contract with (ii) leading academic and bar association articles and reports on the same subject. The case
law and these writings and reports come to the same result. The black letter of § 2 embraces this convergence
and implements the collective approach of these decisions, articles, and reports."'
At the heart of the defense, however, is a blessing of court decisions
that have taken a law and economics approach to consumer contracting. If the terms included are problematic, the market will adjust, but the current approach is deemed necessary to facilitate
commercial activity."

2

This article doesn't necessarily aim to choose sides in this
debate, but rather offer up an alternate approach to dealing with
standard terms: legislation. To demonstrate that legislation is the
appropriate method for addressing standard terms, I look to what
we can expect from businesses if the Restatement approach is
adopted. In other words, if businesses are allowed to continue to

10 MacDougall, supra note 98.
" Steven O. Weise, The Draft Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Follows the Law, ALI ADVISER (April 5, 2019), http://www.thealiadviser.org/consumer-contracts/the-draft-restatement-of-the-law-consumer-contracts-follows-the-law/
112 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir.
2004) ("While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new
situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract. It is
standard contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of
the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which
accordingly become binding on the offeree."); Caspi v. Microsoft Network,
L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118, 126 (N.J Super Ct. App. Div. 1999) ("Plaintiffs must
be taken to have known that they were entering into a contract; and no good
purpose, consonant with the dictates of reasonable reliability in commerce,
would be served by permitting them to disavow particular provisions or the contracts as a whole.").
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pile boilerplate into every consumer contract, can we rely on them
to refrain from overreaching under a general sense of ethics?
III.

AN OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES TO
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

With different groups advocating for different approaches
to the Restatement project, it is useful to reflect on whether we can
count on corporations (and other business entities) to voluntarily
adopt standards of disclosure without a legal obligation to do so.
This requires a brief discussion of the concept of corporate social
responsibility ("CSR"). This task is made more difficult by virtue
of the fact that CSR means different things to different people.
Some view CSR as limited to owing core duties to shareholders and
to obey the law, while others believe corporations owe a broader
duty to other stakeholders. These approaches are described below,
followed by an overview of how business management academics
view the topic. Ultimately, regardless of approach, the issue comes
down to a tension between what is ethical and what is profitable.
A. Legal ScholarlyApproaches
Legal academics can largely be split into two camps: shareholder primacy proponents and stakeholder model proponents.
Shareholder primacy proponents believe that the corporation is in
and of itself a good thing, and that the primary focus of the corporate managers should be to make a profit, within the bounds of the
law. This approach to CSR is most often associated with the economist Milton Friedman who famously wrote:

[T]there is one and only one social responsibility of business--to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and
free competition, without deception or fraud."3
This approach does not advocate promoting profits for its own
sake, but rather as part of the corporate directors' duties owed to
113 Milton Friedman, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2d ed. 1982). See also
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business, in THE ESSENCE OF
FRIEDMAN 36, 36-38 (Kurt R. Leube ed., 1987) [hereinafter Friedman, Social
Responsibility].
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the shareholders." 4 This approach is considered by many as the
one that is followed by American corporate law." 5
In contrast to the shareholder primacy model is the stakeholder model. Under this approach, the corporation owes its very
existence to the state, and thus should be "tinged with a public purpose."1 6 Under this view, corporations should act not just for the
benefit of the shareholders but should also consider a larger group
affected by the corporation to prevent "opportunistic exploitation
by the firm and its shareholders.""' Such stakeholders include employees, customers, the local community and can even encompass
the global community particularly with regard to environmental
concerns.1 8 This approach does not require corporations to oper-

ate as eleemosynary institutions, but does expect good corporate
citizenship." 9
Though these two approaches help frame the CSR debate,
they are not the only two theories of corporate purpose. Margaret
M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout have proposed a team production theory which recognizes that corporate outputs are the result of the
See Colin Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, Symposium, The Corporate
Lawyer's Role in a ContemporaryDemocracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1279
(2009) ("This first approach, sometimes referred to as a shareholder primacy
norm, is consistent with the property or contract model of the corporation, in
which the corporation is viewed as the property of the shareholders, and the
purpose of the corporation is predominantly to increase the shareholders'
wealth."); Ritsa Gountoumas, The Hybrid Approach: Balancing A Corporation's Economic Desires Against Its Social Responsibility, 17 U.C. DAVIs Bus.
L. J. 197, 199 (2017) ("[P]roponents of shareholder primacy and shareholder
wealth maximization stand firm in their belief that the corporation's primary,
and in fact, only, constituency is the shareholder, the "owner" of the business.
Consequently, under this model, shareholder interests are prioritized and corporate managers are given the task of maximizing corporate profits in order to
increase shareholder wealth.").
15 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team ProductionTheory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 287-88 (1999) (noting that the derivative suit
and shareholder voting rights seem to support this view).
116 William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 265 (1992).
14

117

Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corpo-

rate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 447 (2010).
118 Id
119 See Marks & Rapoport, supra note 114, at 1280 ("This approach is concerned with not just the shareholders but also the non-shareholder stakeholders-a broad stakeholder model.").
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efforts of various possible groups including shareholders, executives, employees, creditors or the local community."12 They argue
that though corporate law gives special rights to shareholders, this
is really a recognition that shareholders are in the best position to
represent the rights of the other constituencies. 2 ' The corporate
structure to them is really a mediated hierarchy under which directors serve the "joint interests of all stakeholders who comprise
the corporate 'team." 2 2 An alternative approach proposed by Stephen M. Bainbridge is a director primacy approach." 3 This approach builds upon the "nexus of contracts" approach to contracts,
and posits that, because consensus-based decision-making would
be unworkable in a corporate setting, corporations must adopt an
authority-based structure. 2 4 The board of directors fills this role.
As he notes, "[t]he decision to enter into the set of contracts to
which the corporation is a party is a decision made by the board or
its subordinates acting pursuant to properly delegated authority.
In this sense, the board is the nexus of the set of contracts among
the factors of production making up the firm."125
Each of the theories described above, however, seek to define to whom the directors of a corporation primarily owe a duty.
Shareholder primacy theorists appear to be the starting point, and
the reactions to this approach vary, but many seek to explain why
it is justified to act in the benefit of other constituencies. These approaches do not neatly define what social responsibilities are owed
- for that we can find more guidance in the business management
literature.12 6

120
121
122

Blair & Stout, supranote 115, at 250.
Id at 289.
Id at 288-89.

123 Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means andEnds of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 554-60 (2003).

124 Id at
125 Id at
126

557.
559.

See Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding

the Corporate "Conscience" 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1149 (2008) (noting how
management literature defines four types of CSR); Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale
of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1647 n.54 (2006) (advising legal
academics to look to management literature for guidance in defining CSR).
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B. Business Management'sDescriptive CSR

As I have written previously, the business management literature does a better job of trying to describe what social responsibilities are owed by corporations than the legal literature. One of
the most seminal descriptive structures was a pyramid of social responsibilities put forth by Professor Archie Carroll. 2 1
In 1979, Carroll categorized CSR into four social responsibilities that businesses have to society: economic responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical responsibilities, and discretionary (sometimes called philanthropic)
responsibilities. The first category, economic responsibility, represents the basic responsibility of a business to be
profitable. The second category, legal responsibility, represents the responsibility of a business to operate within
the framework of legal requirements. The third category,
ethical responsibility, represents the "responsibility to do
what is right, just, and fair." Though ethical norms are
embodied in both the economic and legal responsibilities,
this category embodies society's "expectations of business
over and above [any] legal requirement." The final category, discretionary or philanthropic responsibility, repre-

sents society's expectation that a business should assume
social roles above and beyond its economic, legal, and
ethical responsibilities. This could include making contributions for "various kinds of social, educational, recreational, or cultural purposes."1 2 8

Carroll's last of these, philanthropic, has been somewhat controversial, which he himself has acknowledged, and some, including
myself, have recast these responsibilities into just economic, legal
and ethical.1 2 9 As this article is primarily concerned with the
127

See Aviva Geva, Three Models of CorporateSocialResponsibility:Inter-

relationshipsBetween Theory, Research, andPractice, 113 Bus. & Soc'Y REV.
1, 2 (2008) (calling Carroll's 1979 article on CSR a "foundational article on social
performance."); Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, CorporateCitizenship: Toward
an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 167
(2005) (noting that Carroll's model of CSR is widely cited).
128 Colin P. Marks & Paul S. Miller, Plato, The Prince, and Corporate Virtue: PhilosophicalApproaches to CorporateSocial Responsibility, 45 U.S.F. L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (2010).
129

Marks & Rapoport, supra note 114, at 1274-82.
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tensions between these three categories, I will not address the philanthropic any further.

The three categories of economic, legal and ethical are not
mutually exclusive, and ideally a corporation can meet all three. It
is when there is a tension that the legal approaches become most
relevant, particularly when the economic is at odds with the ethical
responsibility. Shareholder primacy theory would stress the economic and legal obligations, whilst approaches that advocate for a
greater concern for stakeholders stress the ethical obligations."'
The question often then becomes, so long as the corporation is profitable, should it eschew further profits in the name of doing what
is ethical absent a legal obligation to do so?"'
C. When Profitand Ethics Clash
Ideally the here responsibilities work together - corporations can make a profit while obeying the law and generally acting
ethically. Scholars may dicker over whether the "ethical" obligations are just window dressing to increase corporate profits. Friedman argued as much, noting that if a corporation were to undertake some socially responsible action that helped the local
community, it was really helping its own employees and itself, and
thus should not be considered corporate social responsibility. 3 2
Most would agree that following the law is not an optional course
of action, though this may or not be ethical, depending on the
law.

33

"1 Seeid. at 1277-79 (distinguishing the economical focus of the shareholder

&

primacy theory from the ethical focus of stakeholder-oriented approaches).
131 See Williams, supra note 126, at 1635-36 (recognizing the increasing involvement of global companies going beyond what the law requires to effectuate
CSR initiatives).
132 Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 113, at 40-41.
133 Reasonable people could debate, for instance, the
ethics of immigration
laws and prohibitions on hiring illegal immigrants. And some, including Judge
Easterbrook, have suggested that responsible corporate managers should consider the nature of the regulation at issue, the punishment, and the chance of
getting caught as part in deciding whether to follow a regulation or skirt. Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook
Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target'sManagementin Respondingto
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1192-94 (1981).
Managers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws just
because the laws exist. They must determine the importance of these laws. The
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What should corporate managers do, however, when maximizing profits clashes with what is ethical? Stakeholder primacy
adherents would argue that, so long as the corporation is still profitable, it should do the ethical thing, regardless of the fact that it
may minimize shareholder value, as that is but one of the interests
that a corporation serves.1"' But the reality is that the current structure of the law encourages corporate directors to act primarily in
the interest of stockholders, not stakeholders." Furthermore, it is
naive to think a business will risk profits by engaging in conduct

beyond what the law requires when competitors do not.1'36
In the past I have analogized this situation to professional
sports and performance enhancing drugs (PEDs).137 If a sport does

penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of how much it wants
firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is
based on the supposition that managers not only may but also should violate the
rules when it is profitable to do so.

Id.
134 See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of
StakeholderRhetoric on CorporateNorms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 680 (2006) (identifying stakeholder primacy theory as "viewing corporate responsibility as a balance of the interests of all corporate constituents, even when that balance does
not maximize profits."); Id ("[M]any critics of the stakeholder theory misconceive this approach as an attempt to completely subordinate a corporation's
profit-making concerns. Under the definition advanced here, the stakeholder
theory advocates that corporations achieve a better balance of all interests, while
underscoring the importance of corporations' willingness to subordinate or
abandon their concerns for profit when appropriate."); Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 258 (2010) ("[S]takeholder theory rejects the idea of maximising a single objective, as one gets with shareholder primacy where the focus
is all on maximising shareholder wealth. As a normative thesis, stakeholder theory holds to the legitimacy of the claims on the corporation by many different
groups and people. Managers are obliged to deal transparently and honestly
with all stakeholders, and ask: What will stakeholders think about the decision
we are contemplating? They then should consider which stakeholders warrant
or require consideration.").
135

Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a

Clear-Eyed Understandingof the Power and Accountability Structure Established By the Delaware CorporationLaw, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 78182 (2015).
136 Colin P. Marks, Online Terms as In Terrorem Devices, 78 MD. L. REV.
247, 288-89 (2019).
137 Id at 289.
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not ban or police the use of PEDs, then a superior athlete who does
not use PEDs may find their competitive edge has been lost to another athlete who does use PEDs.1 38 The ethical athlete faces a
choice: remain ethical but lose the competitive edge, and thus the
money that comes with being a superior athlete, or use PEDs to
regain their edge which was only lost due to the other athletes acting unethically. Or, to grab an example from recent headlines, Senator Elizabeth Warren's reversal on her approach to accepting super PAC money also illustrates how competitive pressures affect
decision-making. Senator Warren originally pledged not to accept
super PAC money, but found herself at a competitive disadvantage
when all of the other Democratic primary contestants did accept
such money.1 39 Senator Warren's explanation could be the explanation of just about any corporate director facing the same choice:
"'If all the candidates want to get rid of super PACs, count me in,
I'll lead the charge,' she told reporters on Feb. 20 in Nevada when
asked if she would disavow Persist PAC. 'But that's how it has to
be. It can't be the case that a bunch of people keep them and only
one or two don't."140
If paragon of corporate ethics such as Elizabeth Warren is
forced to cave to such pressures, it is naive to think a corporate
manager won't as well.141 What is needed is to change the incentive
138

Id

Alana Abramson, Elizabeth Warren Condemned Super PACs. Now
She's Benefiting From One, TIME
(Feb. 28,
2020
9:12
P.M.),
https://time.com/5792563/elizabeth-warren-super-pac-support/ ("Massachusetts
Senator Elizabeth Warren is receiving millions of dollars in help from the kind
of outside money group she has repeatedly decried, underscoring the tough realities of a primary contest featuring two self-funded billionaires and a collection
of rivals benefiting from political-action committee money.").
140 Id
(quoting Senator Warren).
141 Strine, supra note 135, at 788 ("Under the current legal rules and power
structures within corporate law, it is naive to expect that corporations will not
externalize costs when they can. It is naive to think that they will treat workers
the way we would want to be treated. It is naive to think that corporations will
not be tempted to sacrifice long-term value maximizing investments when powerful institutional investors prefer short-term corporate finance gimmicks. It is
naive to think that, over time, corporations will not tend to push against the
boundaries of whatever limits the law sets, when mobilized capital focused on
short-term returns is the only constituency with real power over who manages
the corporations. And it is naive to think that institutional investors themselves
will behave differently if action is not taken to address the incentives that cause
their interests to diverge from those people whose funds they invest.").
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structure so that acting ethically does not hurt the competitive position. Thus, when ethics and profit collide, the response that is
most likely to force corporations to make the ethical choice is to
mandate it by law.1 2 As the Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., former
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court has explained:
It is more productive to take the legal rules and corporate
power structure as it is, and to advance proposals that
make sure that corporations operate in a way that encourages more responsible behavior and that maximizes
long-term welfare, within the bounds of that structure.
Doing so requires an understanding that strong and effective externality regulation is important, because the
profit- pressure put on corporations by institutional in-

vestors is strong. Moreover, understanding the boundaries of the law is critical to protecting society, because
stockholders will put pressure on corporate managers to
seek as much profit as they can within the range of legally
permissible conduct. With this awareness, people who
wish to see for-profit corporations act in a manner that is
aligned with the ordinary Americans whose capital they
hold for generations will realize that it is necessary to figure out how to make sure that those who act as direct
stockholders--institutional investors--invest and vote
with these interests in mind.'

As explained below, contract formation in the context of
consumer law is an area in which the public may wish corporations
to act one way, but the incentives are not properly in place to make
them do so.

IV.

CSR,

CONSUMER CONTRACTS AND THE NEED
FOR LEGISLATION

The ways in which standard terms are presented to consumers, be it through rolling contracts or through the various
online "wrap" agreements, present a situation in which ethics
clashes with profits. As discussed below, ethically, consumers
should not expect businesses to sneak terms into their contracts
that defeat the reasonable expectations of the consumer. But
142
143

Id at 786-88; Budnitz, supranote 108, at 272-73.
Strine, supra note 135, at 786-88.
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businesses have little incentive to do more than the minimum required by law, as doing so could place them at a competitive disadvantage. A legislative response, akin to the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, could mandate the ethical disclosure of standard
terms, add foreseeability to the businesses in how to present terms,
create an equal playing field for all businesses, and protect the reasonable expectations of consumers.
A. The Ethics ofDisclosingStandard Terms
Rolling contracts, and many forms of "wrap" agreements,
suffer the same defect in that they hide terms that often adversely
affect consumers rights. This is not to say that all such terms are
bad - informing the consumer of extended warranty rights likely

would be welcome by the consumer. Further, giving reasonable
notice of the terms in a way that makes the consumers aware that
their rights are curtailed could largely solve the problem,' 4 4 but
most rolling contracts and "wrap" agreements do not do so.
Rolling contracts have been attacked on their legal grounds,
but they also fail as a moral and ethical matter. Easterbrook put
forth that the approach was necessary as businesses couldn't possibly fit all of the terms they wanted on the package,1 45 nor expect
check-out clerks to read the terms, but this presents a false choice.
Businesses can still provide terms, but would likely be limited to
the most important ones and thus simply have to make a choice
about what was worth putting on the package.1 46 Businesses add
the terms later because they can, not because they need to. As Bern
has noted, the rolling contract approach "encourages vendors to
strategically hold back information to create a setting in which
they can act opportunistically,"'4 7 but such a rule fails to protect
the reasonable expectations of consumers that once they buy something, the deal is done.1 48 Bern summarizes,

John E. Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling ContractFormation Theory, 50 DuQ. L. REV. 35, 77 (2012).
145 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-51
(7th Cir. 1996).
146 Preston & McCann, supra note 86, at 9 ("We believe
the seven-by-nineby three-inch box in which software is sold would provide plenty of space if the
terms were limited to the reasonable number of terms necessary to protect intellectual property written in plain English.").
147 Bern, supranote 85, at 739.
148 Id at 748.
144
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[Rolling contract] compels such buyers, contrary to their
reasonable expectations, to give up the deals they thought
they had made. While denying protection to reasonable
expectations of buyers, it rewards the unreasonable expectations of vendors that buyers acquire no ownership
rights when they pay for the goods, and that retention of
goods by such buyers after they have had time to learn
about the objectionable terms means the buyers are
promising to accept and abide by them.1 49
Again, it is not per se to attempt to provide terms later, but it is
unethical to try and unilaterally impose terms later that were never
brought to the attention of the consumer when the contract was
first being formed."'
Wrap agreements present a different challenge as, unlike
rolling contracts, the terms are available to review prior to the consumer proceeding, but this does not mean that such terms are reasonable or even being presented in an ethical manner.' 5 ' As noted,
browsewrap agreements are the most susceptible to legal attacks
as they require the least amount of active assent. Yet in a recent
empirical review of the largest 113 retailers of goods, I found that
over seventy percent were still using browsewrap, as opposed to

only three percent using clickwrap.1 2 The substance of the agreements is also often skewed against the rights of the consumers.
Ninety-four percent of the businesses studied had a clause limiting
liability; eighty-five percent had a clause disclaiming warranties;
eighty-one percent had a choice of law clause; fifty-seven percent
had a forum selection clause; thirty-five percent had an arbitration
clause; thirty-four percent had a jury waiver; and thirty-four percent had a class action waiver."' Most telling, however, is that
none of the retailers studied attempted to bind consumers to such

149

Id

Preston & McCann, supranote 86, at 33-34.
Kim, supranote 100 (noting the lack of social responsibility the Restatement of Consumer Contracts encourages with regard to "wrap" agreements);
Paul J. Morrow, Cyberlaw: The Unconscionability/ Unenforceabilityof Contracts (Shrink-wrap, Clickwrap, and Browse-wrap) on the Internet: A MultijurisdictionalAnalysis Showing the Need for Oversight, 11 PITT. J. TECH. L.
POL'Y 1, 28 (2011).
152 Colin P. Marks, Online and 'As Is" 45 PEPP.
L. REV. 1, 30, 38 (2017).
153 Id
at 39.
150

&
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terms when products were bought in-store." In other words, not
only are businesses using the least noticeable form of "wrap" agreement to try and bind their consumers, but when faced with a choice
in-store of presenting these terms (and possibly losing a sale) or living without the terms, they choose the latter.
Like the choice to use rolling contracts, businesses that
choose to do business online could pick a "wrap" method that does
a better job of informing consumers of terms to which they are
agreeing and require more active assent. 5 Businesses choose not
to do this because it could cost them a sale. Anything that slows a
consumer down from the ultimate purchase may cost the business
a sale, and so businesses choose to use less noticeable forms of assent to increase profits. In other words, the businesses that use
browsewrap and even clickwrap know the terms are not adequately brought to their consumers' attention, but they have made
a conscious effort to use these methods in exchange for increasing
the likelihood of a sale.' 56 Businesses seek to gain the financial

154

Id at 29, 48.

See, e.g., Hancock v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 701
F.3d 1248,
1257-58 (10th Cir. 2012) (approving clickwrap terms where technicians presented customers with printed copy of terms and gave customers opportunity to
review those terms, customers had to agree to terms by clicking on "I
Acknowledge" button on web application, which was presented on technician's
laptop, before technicians proceeded with installation, and customer had to
acknowledge through checkbox that he had "read, understand[s], and agree[s]
to the content of the documents checked above."). See also Madelyn Tarr, Ac155

countability Is the Best (Privacy)Policy: Improving Remedies for Data Breach
Victims Through Recognition of PrivacyPoliciesAs Enforceable Agreements,
3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 162, 192 (2018) (discussing online companies' choice to
increase the level of notice given to consumers by "by forcing active assent in
the form of a mandatory checkbox (known as a 'clickwrap agreement') or requiring the consumer to open the documents and physically scroll through the
text before they are given the option to proceed with registration ('scrollwrap
agreements'). The higher the level of notice a consumer is given, the more likely
the contract is an enforceable agreement.").
156 Colin P. Marks, Online Terms as In Terrorem Devices, 78 MD. L. REV.
247, 288 (2019). See also Walter A. Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual
Stores: World Wide Web Sites and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1283 (1998) ("[T]he owner of a Web site risks alienating
virtual visitors if she forces them to first view all of the legal information that a
cautious lawyer might recommend."); Nancy S. Kim, Contract'sAdaptation and
the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1351 (2011) ("A business may lose
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benefits of the transaction while trying to avoid the consequences
of using less noticeable forms of assent when they try to enforce
these boilerplate clause - this is unethical. Ideally businesses would
at the very least use clickwrap, but also include in the click an explicit notice of the major terms that negative affect consumers.
This does not necessarily mean all of the gritty details, but at the
very least some sort of description that the consumer, for instance,
is agreeing to an arbitration clause.
B. Businesses Incentives and DisclosingStandard Terms

So why don't businesses use more explicit forms of assent?
Why don't we see the more explicit warnings on the outside of
packages? Why isn't clickwrap the default method of assent instead of browsewrap? Simply put, businesses are doing what they
are incentivized to do.
Legally, there is little incentive for businesses to try and
provide more notice of terms up front. At worst, a court might later
decide, should a clause be challenged, that the clause was ineffective against that particular litigant.'5 7 But the business will not suffer a fine for having included the clause, or be discouraged from
continuing to include the clause and present it in the very same
way moving forward.1 58 Further, even when a clause might be un-

enforceable, uninformed consumers won't know this. For instance,
a business may license software online and use browsewrap terms
located inconspicuously at the bottom of the initial page. One of

customers if it asks them to sign contracts before processing relatively minor
purchases.").
157 See e.g. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171,
1178-79 (9th Cir.
2014) ("[W]e therefore hold that where a website makes its terms of use available
via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides
no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users
must click on-without more-is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice."); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340-41 (D. Kan. 2000)
(finding insufficient evidence that consumer had notice of shrinkwrap terms
placed inside the product's box and insufficient evidence of assent to such
terms).
158 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of DisclosingStandard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 171 (2017) ("[I]f the worst thing that will
happen is that the term will get thrown out, there is no reason not to include it
and hope for the best").
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the terms may be a notification that it may share email and other
personal data with associate companies. When a consumer calls to
complain, the business representative can simply point to the
clause, and the consumer, unaware that it was presented in an unenforceable way, may drop the complaint believing the clause is
binding.159
Aside from the in terrorem effect that may benefit businesses from presenting terms in such a passive way, businesses also
face competitive pressures not to do more than the law requires.
Assume a business, based on a sense of ethics, decided to abandon
browsewrap terms in favor of a scrollwrap agreement. Their web-

site would be designed so that before checking out, the consumer
would have to scroll through a lengthy agreement, and only upon
reaching the bottom could the consumer agree. While such a decision would call the lengthy terms to the attention of the consumer,
it also risks the buyer abandoning the transaction. What's worse,
the consumer may now go to a competitor's site and make the purchase, even though the competitor is using the exact same terms
but is presenting them through browsewrap. As discussed above,
under such competitive pressures, businesses will feel compelled to
do what their competitors are doing.
C. Legislature as a Response to Consumer DisclosureAbuses
The Restatement of Consumer Contracts blesses the continued use of rolling contracts and a variety of "wrap" terms despite their deficiencies in providing adequate notice to consumers
or respecting their reasonable expectations. As discussed above,
businesses cannot be expected to do more than the law is requiring
under some vague sense of corporate social responsibility. But to
be fair to businesses, foreseeability is required. Businesses need
guidance on what terms are going to be enforceable and how they
should be presented, but also need the assurance that they are on
159

See Larry Bates, AdministrativeRegulation of Terms in Form Contracts:

A ComparativeAnalysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1,
25 (2002) (positing that the persistent use of unenforceable terms stems from
sellers' knowledge that buyers typically believe the terms are enforceable);
Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract

Terms: Evidence From the ResidentialRental Market, 9 J.
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1,

7 (2017) ("Consumers might be discouraged from claiming their rights through
judicial procedure, given the in terrorem effect produced by the mere appearance of the unenforceable provision in the contract.").
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an even playing field with their competitors. Rather than continue

to rely on various court pronouncements that essentially legislate
from the bench, stronger efforts should be made to ask for legislative, preferably on the federal level, guidance.' 6 0
A legislative approach would allow different interest
groups to present information about the presentation of standard
terms, but also about the enforceability of certain terms as well,
which really lies at the heart of many court challenges.' 6 ' I am not
the only commentator who has observed that legislation is an appropriate alternative to a Restatement in the area. As Fred Miller
has noted:
[T]he determination of what restrictions on contract
terms are appropriate seems to be a legislative task and
not a judicial one. A legislature can conduct appropriate
studies and legislate broadly. A judge only has a limited
and particular set of facts before him or her, which typically leads to uncertainty about the application of any
ruling on restrictions to other cases and scenarios. Moreover, unlike a judicial decision, a statute requires consensus and gives interested parties an opportunity to provide
input.1 2

Of course, there may be concerns over whether such legislation is
capable of being enacted in such divisive times. However, Congress has shown a willingness, even recently, to act when consumer
abuse is suspected, such as with the enactment of the Consumer
Review Fairness Act, which was signed into law in 2016, and
which prohibits companies from having non-disparagement

clauses in their contracts or terms of services with consumers.1 63
The details of such legislation are beyond the scope of this
article, but the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act could provide a
good model for such legislation. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty

160 See Budnitz, supra note 108, at 272 (noting the advantages of uniformity
that would result from federal legislation governing consumer contracts).
161 Fred H. Miller, Expert Analysis: A Critique of ALIs
Consumer Con-

tracts Restatement, 22 CONSUMER FIN. SERV. L. REP. 18 (2019), available at
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor. com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2 019/05/FMiller-Article-in-2 2 CFSLR18.pdf.
162 Id
163 Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub.
L. No. 144-258, 130 Stat.
1355 (2016) (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 45(b)).
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Act was enacted to address concerns that sellers' warranties were
becoming too confusing for the average consumer.1 64 In response to
fears that what "[t]he bold print giveth and the fine print taketh
away,"'6 5 the Act addresses these concerns in two ways: by setting
out minimum informational standards associated with warranties;'6 6 and by providing substantive limitations on certain disclaimers when a warranty is given."' Importantly, the Act permits

consumers to bring suit in state or federal court1 68 and provides that
a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorneys' fees.1 69 As with many
federal acts, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides broad
rules but leaves specific guidance to the Federal Trade Commission, which can be found in the C.F.R.
Similar to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, a federal act
could set out minimum standards for how terms should be disclosed, both in store and online. Such legislation could make a failure to present terms in the appropriate way unenforceable, and
could lead to actions by state attorney generals and the FTC. Importantly, putting this issue to the legislature would give consumer
advocate groups and businesses alike the opportunity to debate
what is really at the heart of this - the terms themselves. I would
hope that beyond simply mandating how terms are presented, such
legislation could be used to curb overreaching in areas of privacy,
as well as in substantive and procedural rights that might run
counter to the reasonable expectations of the consumer.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Restatement of Consumer Contracts has been a controversial project, and one that may not even come to fruition.
Consumer advocates and those representing business interests
both have called for the project to either be terminated or
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
165 H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 22-29 (1974), reprintedin
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
164

7702, 7706.
15 U.S.C. § 2304(a), (e) (1975).
Jonathan A. Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer
Product Warranties, 55 N.C. L. REV. 835, 851-52, 862, 869-72 (1977).
168 15 U.S.C § 2310(d)(1) (1975). See id. at § 2310(d)(3)(B) (1975) (describing
federal jurisdiction threshold requirements, such as the amount in controversy
must be at least $50,000).
169 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1975).
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transferred over to a Principles project. Some, including myself in
this article, argue that legislation is a better path. I see this project
as highlighting one area in particular that may be federally regulated - standard terms.
The Restatement would bless rolling contracts and "wrap"
agreements, though in fairness to the drafters, some important limitations are in place. However, the approaches adopted have been
heavily criticized by consumer advocates and scholars. If the Restatement were to pass in its current form, it is foreseeable many
more courts would adopt these approaches, which essentially
means that we must rely on the businesses themselves to act more
ethically in the way terms are presented. However, the structure of
corporate law and competitive pressures make corporate social responsibility an unlikely protector of consumer interests. If we truly
believe that businesses should provide better notice of standard
terms, the best solution is through legislation.
A legislative approach has the advantages of robust debate
and information gathering, but also would provide a uniform ap-

proach to these issues. Uniformity will help businesses and consumers alike in that businesses will get predictability and guidance
on how to present terms, and consumers will be given fair warning

of the transactions they are entering into. Such a solution could
provide more teeth than the case-by-case adjudication that only
invalidates one clause at a time. But beyond how the terms are
presented, federal legislation would also present an opportunity to
curb the worst tendencies of business to overreach.
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